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Between 2007 and 2018, the pick-up artist community—“gurus” who teach online 
networks of heterosexual men to seduce women—gave rise to a different online 
community, that of “incels,” who create homosocial bonds over their inability to become 
a pick-up artist. In this article, we offer a conjunctural analysis of this shift and argue that 
this decade represents a decline in, or even a failure of, neoliberalism’s ability to secure 
subjects within its political rationality. We argue that neoliberalism cannot cope with its 
failures, especially its promises of self-confidence. Such promises themselves become 
exposed as confidence games, which are then rerouted through networked misogyny, 
resulting in ordinary and spectacular violence against women. Moreover, incels express 
their rage through language of uprising and a war on women. Their actions are on a 
continuum of reactive violent responses to women’s refusal of social reproduction roles 
and aim to defend and restore patriarchal order. 
 
Keywords: incels, misogyny, popular feminism, neoliberalism, pick-up artists, social 
reproduction, confidence 
 
 
In 2007, the cable channel VH1 aired The Pickup Artist (Demyanenk & Gladstone, 2007), a reality 
program featuring a group of men who had difficulties connecting romantically with women. The contestants 
were mentored by a “master” pick-up artist (PUA) named Mystery, whose perspective was simple: Learn 
the requisite techniques of seduction and control, and you will be able to have sex with any woman you 
want. Each week, the contestants tried out their new skills “in field” (in nightclubs, in grocery stores, on city 
streets). At the end of each episode, Mystery eliminated the man who demonstrated the weakest PUA skills. 
At season’s end, Mystery “crowned” a new master PUA, who received $50,000 and toured the globe with 
Mystery to train new PUAs. When interviewed in 2013 about his success in the PUA industry, Mystery said, 
 
 
1 We would like to thank Rosalind Gill, Catherine Rottenberg, Val Hartouni and Nick Anstead for reading 
drafts of this article. We are grateful to Vanessa Ciccone, who helped with formatting an earlier version. We 
also want to thank Zoe Glatt, who provided excellent feedback and editorial assistance with the final version. 
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I didn’t have this when I started out. So I decided to take the bull by the horns and learn 
this, and solve this, by myself. Because back then there were no seminars, DVDs, “in-
field” workshops. I then went online, seeking like-minded individuals . . . and I discovered 
a small online community of individuals like myself seeking some guru . . . I discovered 
that I became the reluctant guru. (Cliff’s List, 2013, video clip) 
 
A year after this interview, 22-year-old Elliot Rodger killed six people and wounded 14 others in 
Santa Barbara, California; the ostensible reason behind his massacre was that he was a “frustrated pick-up 
artist.” He justified his actions in his “manifesto” as retaliation against women as a group for refusing to 
provide him with the sex he felt he was owed. Rodger went on his rampage apparently because he identified 
as an incel (“involuntarily celibate”), a member in an online community of men united in their injury by their 
inability to convince women to have sex with them. 
 
In the years between 2007 and 2014, the PUA community, with men such as Mystery working as 
“gurus” to teach online communities of heterosexual men to seduce women, increasingly shared cultural 
space with a different online community, that of “incels,” who create homosocial bonds over their inability 
to become a PUA. Mystery’s techniques to pick up women, such as “peacocking” (wearing an unusual item 
of clothing to attract interest) or looking for IOIs (indicators of interest, such as playing with one’s hair), 
seem benign, even laughable, in the face of what is increasingly the incel’s response to rejection: violence 
and murder. Mystery stated that his goal was “protecting women and giving them pleasure,” which is, on 
the face of it, quite different from Rodger’s manifesto, titled “The War on Women.” In addition, a number of 
commentators have noted the rise of the incel’s rageful subject emerging from PUA and self-help schemes: 
“Men have generated ideas about self-improvement that are sometimes inextricable from violent rage” 
(Tolentino, 2018, para. 4). As one PUA has commented, “marginalized men in their ranks decide that exiting 
in a blaze of hot lead beats living in loveless obscurity” (North, 2009, para. 12). Indeed, it is telling that 
previous PUA sites attracted incels, many of them disaffected PUAs for whom “the game is rigged from the 
start” (Beau, 2018, para. 11). Sady Doyle (2018) makes the connection clear: “The incel movement grew 
directly out of the PUA fad, a storm cloud of disillusioned students who were ready to try more violent means 
of accessing female bodies” (para. 30). 
 
According to a database from Mother Jones magazine, there have been 114 mass shootings (defined 
as killing four or more people) in the United States since 1982 (Follman, Andersen, & Pan, 2019). Research 
datat from Everytown Gun Safety marks an even higher number, accounting for 173 mass shootings in the 
United States from 2009 to 2017 (Everytown, 2018).  There have been 19 mass shootings in the U.S.  in 2019 
alone (as of August 2019; see Keneally, 2019; Wilson, 2019).2 This period is also the context for the global 
rise of the extreme right. While theories abound about why the extreme right has had a heightened presence 
during the past decade, most concur that an intersecting discourse of loss, injury, and entitlement, primarily 
to and by White men, is a core logic to these movements. We see a parallel in mass misogynistic violence 
 
2 Our primary focus in this article is on mass shootings in the United States; however, we position incel 
mass killings on a global continuum of gendered violence. Inarguably, one factor in the dramatically 
increased number of mass shootings in the United States is easy accessibility to guns, especially 
semiautomatic rifles. 
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committed, in White nationalism (an overwhelming majority of mass shooters in the United States are White 
and have often left racist and misogynist messages on social media) and in the extreme right’s increasingly 
aggressive public actions (which most often have racism and misogyny at their core; see Hawley, 2017; 
Neiwert, 2017; Stern, 2019). A study by The Washington Post on the rise of the extreme right in the United 
States found that White males are more likely to feel “white vulnerability,” or a “strong perception that whites 
are losing ground to other groups through no fault of their own” (Fowler, Medenica, & Cohen, 2017). And 
although not all mass killers identify as incels, since 2007 in North America, many mass killings have been 
claimed by them, and almost all are White.3 It is clear that mass shootings often have a gendered dimension 
to them; a recent article in The New York Times states, “A professed hatred of women is frequent among 
suspects in the long history of mass shootings in America” (Bosman, Taylor, & Arango, 2019, para. 23). The 
article continues by pointing out that in mass shootings in the United States from 2009 to 2017, although it is 
often difficult to precisely locate motivations for these killings (all committed by men), “one common thread 
that connects many of them—other than access to powerful firearms—is a history of hating women, assaulting 
wives, girlfriends and female family members, or sharing misogynistic views online” (Bosman et al., 2019, 
para. 4). 
 
In the following pages, we offer a conjunctural analysis of the shift from PUA to incel and position 
this shift within a wider arc of a specific neoliberal practice: We argue that this period, 2007–2019, 
represents a decline in, or even a failure of, neoliberalism’s ability to secure subjects within its political 
rationality. We use a theory of conjunctures—or historical moments when previously separate forces merge 
to create political and economic transformation—as an analytic to examine the various forces in culture and 
the political economy that intersect as part of neoliberalism’s decline (see Gilbert, 2019, for the most 
updated assessment of what it means to think conjuncturally). 
 
That is, we do not wish to make a sweeping analysis of neoliberalism’s wane as such. We take as 
our starting point Stuart Hall’s analysis of 2008 as ushering in a new conjuncture, which he calls the Great 
Financial Crisis (Hall & Massey, 2010). State and private sector responses to this crisis have been organized 
around austerity, command, and enforcement. We want to focus on the cultural dimension of this crisis 
(which, in economic terms, is called a loss of “consumer confidence” in markets). We are highlighting culture 
as the production of subjectivity, especially as it sustained capitalism and governance pre-crisis and might 
now be unsustainable as a project of self-reproduction. 
 
While speaking to a more general decline in neoliberalism’s integrative powers, we are specifically 
examining the gendered dimension of that failure that manifests in networked misogyny and spectacular 
violence against women. Of course, there are many different points of entry to examine neoliberalism and 
the various ravages that this long era has wreaked on institutions, care networks, infrastructures, and 
everyday lives. We are looking at the time period of 2007–2019 within Western neoliberalism, and we focus 
on a specific practice of neoliberalism, that of subjectivation, within that decade. Again, there can be no 
 
3 Incels have gone even further back in history to claim killers as one of their own, including Marc Lepine of 
the 1989 Montreal Massacre; Charles Carl Roberts IV, who sorted girls from boys in an Amish schoolhouse 
in 2006 and killed five girls; Seung-Hui Cho, the Virginia Tech killer of more than 30 who had recently been 
rejected by his girlfriend; and even serial killer Ted Bundy. 
5006  Jack Bratich and Sarah Banet-Weiser International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
 
doubt that this period marks a devastating increase in violence against women, immigrants, people of color, 
and refugees. We have witnessed countless assaults on civil rights, policies, laws, and other mechanisms 
that have served to (albeit inadequately) secure basic human rights; these assaults have been fueled by 
the election of heads of state who endorse these ideologies (from Orbán to Trump to Bolsonaro) and by an 
emboldened extreme right ideology that features misogyny, racism, and White nationalism at its core. Here, 
we focus specifically on just one manifestation of this political and cultural context: mass gendered violence. 
 
We position the shift from PUA to incel as one analytic from which to theorize the heightened 
violence of this decade. In so doing, we argue that neoliberalism cannot take care of its failures—especially 
its promises of self-confidence, and especially when White men are seen to lose self-confidence, to have 
been denied something they feel the world, and especially women, owes them. Confidence is exposed in 
these failures as confidence games, an exposure that results in rage and violence. In this project, we are 
not positing a cause (even conjunctural) for incel violence. Plenty of others have engaged in such diagnoses, 
and some have even made the key connection between PUA failure and incels (Beauchamp, 2019; DiBranco, 
2018; Doyle, 2018; Nagle, 2017a; Wright, 2018). We are, however, adding more context to the specific 
mechanism of passage from PUAs to incels during the decade 2009–2019. More important, we are treating 
this passage as a symptom of a broader crisis in neoliberal subjectivation. This passage from PUA to incel 
gives us insights into the unsustainability and nonresilience of contemporary masculine neoliberal techniques 
of self. A number of writers have questioned neoliberalism’s ability to sustain itself, noting that its crisis has 
been profound enough to question whether its ideological techniques can hold (Birch & Mykhnenko, 2010; 
Davies, 2017; Negra & Tasker, 2014). Rather than presume neoliberalism’s persistence, resilience, and 
continuity, we need to be attuned to its mutations. We see this unsustainability and crisis most acutely in 
the subject’s inability to restart itself as a subject. 
 
We organize this article into two sections: The first, Part I, will lay out our analytic framework, which 
is a perspective from within neoliberal subjective failure and an attention to social reproduction undergirding 
responses to such failure. Here, we offer a broad analysis of the networked misogyny that is at the core of this 
failure, including an analysis of what has been called Red Pill philosophy. In Part II, we map the specific 
examples of incel violence onto this framework, positioning loss of male self-confidence as a key failure of 
neoliberal subjectivation, and we think through the shift from Red Pill to Black Pill philosophy. We see these 
two elements—neoliberal masculine subjective failure and the shift from Red Pill to Black Pill—as overlapping 
arcs, offering us a glimpse into one manifestation of what we see as a crisis in contemporary neoliberalism. 
 
Part I: Neoliberalism in Decline: Analyzing From the Perspective of Failure 
 
When we use the (rather overused) word neoliberalism, we are concentrating on its modes of 
subjectivation—the ways that postwar governing has encouraged the formation of selves through various 
discourses, strategies of address, and techniques of transformation (Cruikshank, 1999; Dean, 2009; Rose, 
1989). We focus on three dimensions of this mode of subjectivation: entrepreneurship, expertise, and 
expectations. At the intersection of the entrepreneurial orientation (self-starting, individualized, self-
managed) and the reliance on expertise (self-help discourses, training mechanisms, pedagogic figures) , we 
locate confidence as a core value and objective for neoliberal subjectivation (Gill & Orgad, 2017). Our third 
dimension is the gendered component to such confidence building: namely, the masculine expectations 
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around social reproduction (biological, care work, emotional support, comfort) that sustain this 
individualism. That is, rather than presuming that these confidence-building techniques are solely 
individualizing, we argue that neoliberal “individualism” always depended on others, from managing 
resources (including others as instruments) to trusting in experts as guides.4 
 
In this broader framework, we address two failures or declining abilities emerging from the crisis 
in neoliberal reproduction. We first trace neoliberalism’s inability to have its techniques of subjectivation 
stick (to entrepreneurialize subjects via expertise). We argue that the confidence in expertise (that would 
give confidence to the subject) is itself in crisis. We are witnessing a breakdown of expertise and trust in 
the very resources that were supposed to lead to a self-rebooting. 
 
Second, we identify how neoliberalism fails to provide solutions when this subject fails. 
Consequently, the subjective failures (PUAs and incipient PUAs) seek solutions online and turn their 
individual disappointments into a community. Thanks to emerging networked misogyny and its mediated 
forms of support, the feeling of failure is no longer absorbed as one’s own responsibility, but combined and 
accelerated. The result is a networked masculine subject that feels threatened, and a collective figure is to 
blame: women. 
 
We are thus calling for an analytic shift from one that sees neoliberalism’s mode of subjectivation as 
coherent and successfully shored up (e.g., keep taking initiative, overcome your own obstacles, “fail better”) 
to one situated in its crisis (without relegitimation or recuperation). We do not, in other words, presume 
neoliberalism’s steady recuperative power as a material and ideological practice. We posit that failure is the 
most adequate perspective from which to perform a conjunctural analysis, one situated not in the conjuncture’s 
dominance and reproduction, but in its decline. From that we ask, what is emerging from its decline? 
 
This is a perspective from the suture’s unraveling, from an irrecuperable operation where the cycle 
of what Laurent Berlant has called cruel optimism (Berlant, 2011) and unhappy attachments (O’Neill, 2018) 
breaks—resulting in an unhappy detachment. Additionally, we take seriously the fundamental question 
about the role of media culture in this subjectivation as posed by Rosalind Gill and Akane Kanai (2018): 
“What kinds of media are needed in order to maintain what seems to be an otherwise unsustainable 
attachment to individuality?” (p. 325). We now situate that query in a crisis moment within those media 
strategies, the inability to maintain such an attachment, which now becomes increasingly unsustainable. 
These media strategies often find purchase in the context of networked, mediated misogyny and violence 
against women. 
 
Networked Misogyny 
 
 
4 In other words, the entrepreneurial subject has always relied on social relations, even to disrupt or break 
them as “creative destruction.” As key economist Joseph Schumpeter defines it, “What matters is the 
disposition to act. It is the ability to subjugate others and to utilize them for his purposes, to order and to 
prevail that leads to ‘successful deeds’—even without particularly brilliant intelligence”
 
(quoted in Hardt & 
Negri, 2017, p. 141). 
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Clearly, misogyny is not unique to the contemporary moment. However, recent developments in 
the digital media environment have been crucial to constructing what is referred to as the “manosphere,” a 
corner of the Internet that supports and amplifies different kinds of masculinities and men’s rights, including 
“anti-feminists, father’s rights groups, ‘incels’ (involuntary celibates), androphiles (same-sex attracted men 
who don’t identify as homosexual), paleomasculinists (who believe male domination is natural) and even 
more obscure fringe groups” (Marwick & Lewis, 2015, p. 13; see also Banet-Weiser, 2018; Dewey, 2014; 
Domise, 2018; Ging, 2017; Jane, 2016; Massanari, 2017; Nagle, 2017a). 
 
The various sites within the manosphere should not be understood as distinct units or groups, but 
rather as interconnected nodes in a mediated network of misogynistic discourses and practices. As Marwick 
and Lewis (2015) point out, what binds the manosphere is “the idea that men and boys are victimized; that 
feminists in particular are the perpetrators of such attacks” (p. 15). These narratives cohere in what is called 
the Red Pill philosophy (TRP). Taken from the movie The Matrix, TRP touts itself as a revelatory shift in 
masculine thinking that “purports to awaken men to feminism’s misandry and brainwashing, and is the key 
concept that unites all of these communities” (Ging, 2017, p. 3). TRP is a worldview “balancing emotion and 
ideology to generate consensus and belonging among the manosphere’s divergent elements” (Ging, 2017, 
p. 8) and thus provides a shared orientation and belief system for a community—a truly networked misogyny 
(Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2015). Sharing this TRP worldview, we also find pick-up artists, seduction 
communities, and incel threads on sites and forums such as 4chan, Reddit, Return of Kings, redpill.com, 
Chateau Heartiste, and Red Pill Room that are dedicated not only to the accumulating of more erotic capital 
for men, but also to recouping that capital that has been lost. Popular misogyny, expressed concisely in 
TRP, capitalizes on men’s apparent injuries, caused by women and feminism, and offers routes to recoup 
men’s “natural” capacities. 
 
Within this mediated environment, various modes of networked misogyny authorize and support 
one another—for example, when extremism of more violent sites works to support other nodes that are 
seen as milder by comparison. Popular misogyny is a system of shared interconnections and links as well 
as worldviews; PUA sites are interconnected with formalized political attempts to roll back reproductive 
rights for women, which are in turn interconnected with online misogyny and harassment.5 Popular misogyny 
is invested in what Gayle Rubin (1975) has called the traffic in women, but not necessarily to restore the 
nuclear family; there is little sense that PUAs or incels primarily want to settle down into a lifelong committed 
relationship that involves biological reproduction. Instead, their version is tied to ensuring that women 
provide various affective resources: assuaging male egos and confidence via sexual availability, gratifying 
 
5 This TRP-inspired ecology of neo-masculinization is tied to another emergent force out of the crisis of 
neoliberalism: right-wing movements that seek to impose traditional White identitarian societies. Angela 
Nagle opens the documentary Trumpland: Kill All Normies (2017b), on the rise of the alt-right, with a 10-
minute excursion into the passage from PUAs to incels. Others have noted how the manosphere offers a 
primed terrain for alt-right radicalization (Futrelle, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2015). As online analyst Richard 
Anderson (2016) notes, “So much of the process occurs in public, from the initial steps into seeking a 
community of support, advice on love and life, and the slow redirection into alt-right radicalism” (para. 9). 
Within this overlap between right-wing movements and TRP ecologies, we want to highlight the ways 
reproduction figures in this dynamic. 
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needs, and ensuring feelings of control. As Joey, an incel interviewed for a feature article, puts it, “Women 
represent our way to enter the social hierarchy” (Reeve, 2018, para. 11). In other words, the expectation 
by these masculinized subjects is to access what has been called social reproduction.6 
 
Social Reproduction 
 
In a well-established definition, social reproduction refers to the “various kinds of work―mental, 
manual, and emotional―aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care 
necessary to maintain the existing life and to reproduce the next generation” (Laslett & Brenner, 1989, pp. 
383‒384). Within 1970s Marxist-feminist formulations, the economic role of social reproduction was the 
(unwaged) labor needed to restore men’s capacities for (waged) labor (Dalla Costa & James, 1973; Federici, 
2004; Hartmann, 1981). Recently, these discussions over gender and value have been extended, updated, 
and made more visible (Fortunati, 2015; Serra, 2015; Thorburn, 2016). 
 
What happens when the masculinized forms of waged labor change, when some men no longer can 
realize capacity for labor? The social reproduction framework anchors our analysis of the gendered failure 
of neoliberal subjectivation. When the PUA fails, and men don’t receive what they feel entitled to (specifically 
by virtue of being male, and often also by virtue of being White), how does disappointment express itself? 
When disillusionment with expertise arises, what other recuperative resources are at hand? We posit that 
women, in their role of social reproduction, are expected to be “ready at hand.” 
 
The social reproduction framework thus allows us to connect neoliberalism’s “failures” with its 
“successes”: In both cases, we see expectations of women to enact their role in social reproduction (and 
women’s at least partial refusal of such roles). The failures turn against women because of the (presumed) 
successes that also expect access to women.7 Social reproduction is thus more than a sphere geared toward 
reproducing men’s abilities to work—it reproduces the social order itself. While ostensibly about “sex,” the 
PUA/incel coupling thus foregrounds the extreme desire to maintain a social order via the central role women 
play in maintaining it. And in turn, this mode of subjectivation works through confidence. 
 
The (Crisis of the) Neoliberalization of Confidence 
 
Neoliberal capitalism mandates that individuals become self-entrepreneurs as the best route to 
economic and personal success. Many scholars have analyzed the different ways that “confidence” is a key 
logic to that route for both men and women (Banet-Weiser, 2015, 2018; Elias, Gill, & Scharff, 2017; Gill & 
Orgad, 2017; McRobbie, 2009). Health campaigns, educational programs, and gender equality initiatives 
are centered on “building” confidence in individuals. Even though very few individuals become economically 
successful as self-entrepreneurs, neoliberal logics rest on individualization, which in turn depends on one 
 
6 White supremacists also want these aspects of social reproduction, now configured around a desperate 
need for offspring. 
7 We are thus proposing a different emphasis from the economic analysis that locates the rise of incel 
violence in an economic crisis that leads to working-class loss of jobs (status). That analysis then says that 
these primarily White men scapegoat others—in this case, women. 
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being confident enough in its techniques. Thus, even when they fail, subjects are supposed to restart the 
process (trusting in the techniques and finding responsibility in oneself; Littler, 2017). 
 
Yet, the idea of confidence as an attribute residing in the individual is a recent invention. 
Historically, confidence has been understood primarily as an intersubjective relationship based on trust. 
Confidence, as Sara Ahmed (2016) states, is a “manner of existence . . . the word confidence rests on faith 
or trust. To be confident can thus mean to have trust in an expectation” (para. 11). Confidence, in other 
words, has historically signaled a dyadic and social process, not an attitude that one cultivates in isolation. 
 
By the time neoliberal confidence culture takes hold in the 21st century, confidence has morphed 
from a relational attribute based on trust in others to an individual quality that one must learn to cultivate. 
But despite some of the undeniable ways that neoliberal confidence is individualized, the intersubjective 
quality remains as a trust in experts to help cultivate individual confidence: confidence organizations, self-
help industries, life coaches, gurus, and motivational speakers (Binkley, 2014; Illouz, 2008; McGee, 2007; 
Rose, 1989), often via popular culture (Gill & Orgad, 2017; Hearn, 2008; McRobbie, 2009; Ouellette & Hay, 
2008). The guidance of conduct requires confidence in the guide. 
 
Yet alongside all the exhortations for individuals to be confident, with all the emerging industries 
that specialize in confidence experts to guide such individuals, another historical root of “confidence” needs 
mentioning: the “confidence man” and his “confidence games.” The confidence scheme and its con artist 
relied on the investment of trust, the taking of confidence, to achieve its own ends, forming an interpersonal 
relationship via swindling (Ahmed, 2016; Hearn, 2017). This more sordid history of confidence is crucial to 
understanding the role it plays in the contemporary neoliberal context. 
 
For the classic con game to work, the artist needs to get the mark firmly attached to the game 
itself. This means investing trust in the process and confiding in the artist-guide. When conducting the 
confidence game of neoliberal confidence, trust is directed at the self-help industries, the public pedagogy 
of the confidence game’s instructors. The neoliberalization of confidence means that neoliberalism itself 
needs confidence. What happens when trust in those guides erodes? It is this confidence, in the con games, 
that is in crisis when we speak of neoliberalism’s crisis. 
 
A number of analysts have noted neoliberalism’s declining effectiveness, inducing a crisis of 
confidence in the system itself (Davies, 2017; Duménil & Lévy, 2011; Wallerstein, Collins, Mann, Derluguian, 
& Calhoun, 2013). We need only look at the broader global economic crisis of 2007–2008 to see a 
concomitant decline in trust in authorizing discourses: journalism, politicians, science. We are indeed in a 
culture of mistrust, often called a post-truth era (Harsin, 2015) connected to the proliferation of conspiracy 
theories, antifactual argumentation, “fake news,” climate change skepticism, and religious-faith-based 
action. The acute crisis of trust also permeates the expertise key to neoliberal modes of subjectivation, 
including dating. 
 
Increasingly since 2008, the failures of neoliberalism to live up to its promise of economic success, 
entrepreneurship, and happiness have been revealed as not just miscalculations or poor efforts, but swindles 
and scams: as confidence games (Hearn, 2017; Lears, 2017; Monbiot, 2017). While the system quickly 
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found individual embodiments of such con artists to function as scapegoats (e.g., Bernie Madoff, whose 
accelerated trial focused collective crisis attention from December 2008 to July 2009), a wider interest in 
con artistry (and exposures of it) became prominent (Konnikova, 2017). We have entered a moment that 
could be characterized as a crisis not only in the techniques of confidence culture (e.g., commodity 
empowerment), but in the underlying confidence in the interpersonal process that allows any technique to 
stick, that allows the confidence game to exist. Neoliberalism, designed to manage and feed off precarity, 
now finds its own techniques and expertise—and trust in them—becoming precarious. 
 
Perhaps most important, the neoliberal strategy of placing responsibility for self-confidence on the 
individual has been exposed as a swindle. As Alison Hearn (2017) notes, the hegemony of the con is “also 
directly linked to a flawed and failing neoliberal governance system that places the responsibility for serious 
systemic problems at the feet of individuals, insisting that we see market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself’” 
(p. 84). The individualization of confidence is breaking down, returning us to the confidence games that 
founded the techniques of individualization: a generalized spread of confidence’s opposite: doubt, mistrust, 
skepticism, or diffidence. 
 
When that confidence, in confidence itself, is broken, what are the results? What happens after the 
great reveal, when we realize that all con artists are, in fact, confidence artists? To address these questions, 
we return now to pick-up artists who are, as their name references, con(fidence) artists. 
 
Part II: Pick-Up Artists as Antisocial Sociability:  
Entrepreneurs, Expertise, and Expectations 
 
We began this article with a description of the 2007–2008 cable reality television series from VH1, 
The Pickup Artist. In this section, we’d like to return to The Pickup Artist in the context of the precarity of 
neoliberal confidence—the exposure of the “con” of confidence. 
 
As Rachel O’Neill (2018) argues in her ethnography of seduction communities in London, pick-up 
artist training refers “to a very particular set of knowledge-practices organized around the belief that the 
ability to meet and attract women is a skill heterosexual men can cultivate through practical training and 
personal development” (p. 3). The PUA industry includes hundreds of websites and organizations across the 
globe dedicated to seducing women. Seminars and boot camps similarly charge exorbitant fees to 
participate; the PUA’s “bible,” The Game by Neil Strauss, has been widely covered in the media and was the 
impetus for VH1’s The Pickup Artist. 
 
This industry promises transformation. As the trailer for The Pickup Artist’s second season states, 
“A man named Mystery took eight lovable losers and turned them into Casanovas.” Mystery attests that the 
seduction industry is dedicated to a kind of masculine pedagogy: a “guru” offers his guidance to those who 
cannot find their way in the heterosexual world of sexual conquest. These communities, and their 
concomitant industries, focus specifically and intensely on confidence—and lack thereof—for men. One of 
Mystery’s accomplices, a woman named Tara, tells the men chosen to be on the VH1 show, “You have to 
go in confident and motivated with lots of energy.” 
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The rise of seduction communities is apparently a response to large numbers of heterosexual men 
who have, for the most part, achieved some financial and career success, as in the tech industries, but have 
yet to overcome the “hurdle” of seducing a woman (Chu, 2014; O’Neill, 2018). Indeed, the men who are 
depicted in the VH1 series are selected for their damaged or stunted masculinities (understood within the 
assumption of heteronormative masculinity). These men never had confidence in the first place—they 
admitted they couldn’t talk to women, they were virgins, they were socially awkward. Sexual confidence is 
explicitly depicted as something that is entitled to them, precisely because they are men. 
 
In PUA communities, men attain a sense of self-confidence through seducing and controlling 
women, which is achieved through learning “game.”8 The training is predicated on the instrumentalization 
and objectification of women, who become vehicles for masculine senses of success and achievement. The 
PUA industry cultivates confidence in oneself (Banet-Weiser, 2018), but, as with neoliberal subjectivation in 
general, via a dependence on others. As Catherine Rottenberg argues (via Wendy Brown), neoliberal 
rationality “recast[s] individuals as capital enhancing agents” (Rottenberg, 2018, p. 7). The entrepreneurial 
subject thus instrumentalizes women as capital to build its self-confidence. These PUA techniques and 
worldviews thus “reconfigur(e) intimate and sexual subjectivities and produc(e) distinctly anti-social forms 
of sociability [emphasis added]” (O’Neill, 2018, p. x ). It is this tension—antisocial sociability—that we wish 
to highlight. 
 
As with other strands of neoliberal confidence culture, PUA training individualizes confidence, 
turning it into a personality trait or internal subjective feature. This entrepreneurialism recasts the sociality 
at the base of classic confidence (confiding in a peer or investing trust in an intimate social relation) into an 
instrumental, antisocial relation. Next, trust is redirected and reinvested in a mediator/expert (Mystery as 
guru, The Game as instructional manual). Entrepreneurship, even when developed as a capacity within the 
self, is thus an inherently social subjectivity—in this case, with gender as the primary axis for (anti)social 
relations. The production of antisocial forms of sociability within intimate relations results, not unexpectedly, 
in a level of sexual manipulation. 
 
The PUA and seduction community emerged as a way to “teach” confidence, to instill mastery in 
men who had been denied this skill mainly by the visibility of popular feminism, where women are exhorted 
to be confident, sexual subjects. Here, sexual confidence is seen as a resource, one in short supply. The 
more women have it, the less men do. Once sexual confidence is defined as a scarce resource, women are 
considered threats to the supply and are thus themselves turned into resources. 
 
Thus, women must be controlled and made less confident in order for men to become confident. 
With PUAs, this includes undermining a woman’s self-confidence (e.g., negging, or insinuating negative 
comments to get her to seek approval). Confidence here means procuring trust and taking one into 
confidence, the core technique of getting the con game to stick—in this case, conning her into having sex 
with you. In this way, the PUA industry is neoliberal misogyny at its peak—a self-help industry that 
 
8 “Game” refers to the pick-up artist’s premier guide book, Neil Strauss’s The Game (2005), in which he 
offers a tutorial on how to master a skill set (game) to pick up women. 
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encourages masculine entrepreneurship for self-confidence, relies extensively on experts as pedagogical 
guides, and expects women to enact social reproduction. 
 
In an interview about his success, Mystery (in the way an ideological subject often slips truth into 
statements) indicates that social reproduction was his motivation. On reflection, he says “[I] realized just 
how lonely I felt. I was so frightened. I didn’t have anyone to hold my hand. If I had the information before, 
I could have saved countless, countless failures. If I had someone, I could have gone through this with 
much less pain.” He became a “reluctant guru” with a vision for intergenerational masculine reproduction: 
“And one day, when they have a beautiful wife, they get to teach this to their son. That’s why I’m doing 
this” (Cliff’s List,  2013, video clip). PUAs develop techniques that instrumentalize women, with the aim of 
controlling women’s sexuality as a means of ensuring women’s place within social reproduction for 
generations to come. 
 
Hate the Game and the Artist (But not for Long) 
 
PUAs also return us to the con at the heart of confidence. In using words like “the game” and “pick-
up artists,” this masculine confidence community borrows from a previous era’s con(fidence) culture. When 
these neoliberal logics of PUAs break down and neoliberalism itself is exposed as a general set of rackets, 
what effect does it have on the pick-up industry, on the artist himself? What results when the jig is up, when 
they’re exposed as petty affect criminals working confidence games, eros grifters running rackets by training 
others? One easy way to see the results is in the story of one website (now defunct) simply titled PUAHate. 
 
VH1’s The Pickup Artist debuted during neoliberalism’s peak, and the series ended with the season 
2 finale in November 2008, in the immediate wake of global economic crashes and anxieties. In the 
subsequent decade, the PUA industry began to generate failures—those who took the classes, attended the 
workshops, watched the videos, or just read the forums, but still could not achieve their goals. Despite its 
failures and unfulfilled promises, neoliberalism’s only resolution to these failures is to continue the con—to 
continue to establish markets around precarity and the loss of confidence. But others used digital culture to 
create a platform for other solutions. 
 
PUAHate was a site formed by such failed seducers; they directly called out PUA confidence culture 
as con games with con artists, identifying the PUA industry as “the scams, deception, and misleading 
marketing techniques used by dating gurus and the seduction community to deceive men and profit from 
them” (Greig, 2014, para. 36). The game was exposed as a game: no illusions, just power. When the 
promise of successful seductions was not fulfilled, in these cases, there was no cruel optimism that rebooted 
the subject. The only cyclical return to the experts was via hostility. Perhaps PUAHate resulted from the lack 
of a process that con artists call “cooling the mark out” after the swindled realize they’ve been duped. The 
anger born of feeling robbed is not managed; there is no “art of consolation” (Goffman, 1952). One result, 
as Goffman names it, is “personal disorganization,” which can result in violence. 
 
PUAHate is a critique of PUA from within a crisis of masculine confidence in the masculine confidence 
game. But this severance from tutelage is only temporary. The blame for failure quickly and vehemently 
moves from the con game to the recalcitrant instruments for self-confidence: women. Evidence of this shift 
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can be found when the PUAHate site temporarily closed in 2014 and reopened with a new name: sluthate. 
Why the shift? If hating PUAs was the reason for the community to exist, why weren’t gurus, or sexually 
successful men, targeted? 
 
Here we would cite the power of PUA antisocial sociality. While PUAHate’s unity was an antisocial 
social bonding against the former instructors, the core antisocial sociality of PUA itself was directed against 
women. That is, even in the PUAHate community, key PUA elements are retained: not a faith in their 
techniques, but an ethos and orientation toward women, who remain an instrument, a target, a reward. 
Women are commodities, they are simply “codes to be broken” (Ricard, 2018). 
 
While neoliberalism encouraged—even promised—happiness, self-confidence, and success 
(Ahmed, 2010; Binkley, 2014), it was not ready to provide an affective structure for the nonattainment of 
these. When these pursuits fail, neoliberalism has no answer—except to place blame on individuals, to fail 
better, to keep consuming. But individuals eventually lose confidence in the command to restart. Even when 
DIY networks of care and support fill the void left by the neoliberal incapacity to provide social solutions, 
this care work often reproduces and affirms the patriarchal social reproduction structures that undergird 
neoliberalism in the first place. As Rottenberg (2018) argues, 
 
as an economic order, neoliberalism relies on reproduction and care work in order to 
reproduce and maintain so-called human capital. However, as a political rationality—and 
in contrast to liberalism—neoliberalism has no lexicon that can recognize let alone value 
reproduction and care work. (p. 16) 
 
Rather, this care work comes in the form of sexual and emotional availability of women, or what Sarah 
Sharma (2018) calls post-mommy labor, an “antisocial” tech design rooted in patriarchy. 
 
The expectations that women will be working for social reproduction, as caregivers (soothing egos, 
offering sexual comfort), are dashed. Without a social solution, failed PUAs turn to each other for support. And 
they do so in hostility against the women who “deny” them their presumed entitlement to intimacy. This rage 
becomes stronger than the frustrated feeling against their tutors. In sum, when the PUA promises are 
unfulfilled, the PUA system might be exposed as a con, but because it depends on the instrumentalization and 
objectification of women, it is easy to slide into vilification of those objectified. As Alex Ricard (2018) points 
out about those who are disaffected by the PUA system, “While they exist as nearly polar opposites of the Pick 
Up Artist community, the result is the same: they view women’s thoughts and feelings as irrelevant. They just 
want a vaguely woman-shaped thing for them to use” (para. 3). The antisocial sociality that structures PUA 
practices also shapes ways of restoring subjects that fail in those practices. 
 
While PUAHaters lose confidence in the con game, they preserve its patriarchal fantasy of 
entitlement and faith in masculine solutions. Because the PUA subject relied on others (in this case, women 
as instruments for entrepreneurial projects and as social reproductive care/comfort givers), the internecine 
hate toward the PUAs easily mutated to indifference, insensitivity, and, ultimately, hostility toward women. 
Here we begin to see the explosive misogynistic results within neoliberalism’s decline. 
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Incels 
 
Enter the incel. Since around 2009, a subculture of heterosexual men calling themselves incels—
involuntarily celibate—has operated as a de facto online peer support community for sexual failures. In 
2009, George Sodini shot and killed three women outside a gym in Pennsylvania, claiming that “30 million 
women” had rejected him in his life (Roth, 2009). Sodini attended seduction seminars and was an avid 
consumer of PUA pedagogy. Pick-up artist Roissy, in good neoliberal fashion, wrote on his blog that if Sodini 
had only learned “game,” women’s lives would have been spared (North, 2009). Two years later, in 2011, 
another PUA, Allen Robert Reyes (who had been featured in The Game under the name “Gunwitch”), 
nonfatally shot a woman in the face for rejecting his advances. 
 
But 2014 became the major turning point for hostile reactions to women as a way to regain 
masculine capacity. Rodger expressed his frustration in his “manifesto,” which he titled “The War on 
Women,” and in his final video when he succinctly expressed the passage from PUA to incel: “If I can’t have 
you, girls, I will destroy you.” He was also a frequent poster to the online site PUAHate discussed earlier 
(Woolf, 2014). The figure who is most infamous for gender-based killing was not only a failed PUA, but one 
who turned against the confidence game that failed him. And, in a telling twist, it was after Rodger’s murders 
that the online site PUAHate was shut down (and transformed into sluthate). 
 
Rodger subsequently became an incel hero, complete with religious fan art that turned him into a 
martyr and saint.9 Just before Alek Minassian killed 10 people in Toronto in 2018 by driving a van into 
pedestrians, he announced on Facebook, “The Incel Rebellion has already begun!” and exclaiming, “All Hail 
the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger!” Since Elliot Rodger killed seven people in his “frustrated pick-up 
artist” rampage, mass killings justified by women’s sexual rejection of men have dramatically increased in 
the West (Bosman et al., 2019; Dvorak, 2018). 
 
Some examples include the following. On February 14, 2018, 19-year-old former student Nicholas 
Cruz killed 17 people at Mary Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida. He reportedly had 
committed domestic violence against his ex-girlfriend and her mother, in addition to threatening his ex-
girlfriend’s new boyfriend. A month later, a 17-year-old male student at Great Mills High School in Maryland 
shot two classmates; one of the victims, who died later of her injuries, was reportedly his ex-girlfriend. In 
May 2018, 17-year-old Dimitrios Pagourtzis, of Santa Fe High School in Texas, shot and killed 10 people, 
including a female student who reportedly rejected the shooter after repeated advances. The student’s 
mother said her daughter “embarrassed him” in front of classmates. In an all-too-familiar reversal of agency, 
the shooter’s father claims that his son was “bullied” and was a “victim, not a criminal” (Crane, 2018). And 
a mere month later, 38-year-old Jarrod W. Ramos went on a shooting spree at the newsroom of the Capital 
Gazette in Annapolis, Maryland, killing five people and wounding two others. The apparent rationale for the 
violent rampage was Ramos’s anger at the paper’s journalists for running a story about his social media 
harassment of a woman. According to court documents, Ramos initially wrote to the woman (a former high 
school classmate) thanking her “for being the only person ever to say hello or be nice” (Dvorak, 2018, para. 
 
9 Incel killings were internally designated as “Going Sodini” until Rodger’s massacre. Subsequently, it 
became known as “Going ER.” 
5016  Jack Bratich and Sarah Banet-Weiser International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
 
15). When the woman suggested counseling, Ramos began sending increasingly hostile and violent 
messages and embarked on a crusade to harass her. The Capital Gazette covered this story; Ramos sued 
them for defamation and lost (Bui, Wiggins, & Jackman, 2018). 
 
During the writing of this article, there have been more mass shootings based in misogyny (though 
the killers were not always identified as incels). In Sutherland Springs, Texas in 2017, a man shot and killed 
26 people in a church; he had been previously convicted of domestic violence, and his wife claimed that “he 
once told her that he could bury her body where no one would ever find it” (cited in Bosman et al., 2019, para. 
3). In August 2019, Connor Betts, who killed nine people (including his sister) with an assault-style weapon at 
a Dayton, Ohio, nightclub, had compiled a kill list and rape list of his high school female classmates. He was 
also in a pornogrind band, singing songs about sexual violence and necrophilia (Wyatt, 2019). 
 
While the established understanding of incels today is infused by what Jia Tolentino (2018) calls a 
“violent political ideology around the injustice of young, beautiful women refusing to have sex with them” 
(para. 6), it didn’t start out that way. Online forums like Reddit’s r/ForeverAlone, IncelSupport, and Love-
Shy.com were places of commiseration and therapeutic expression of isolation, peer support groups for men 
and women who were lonely, alienated, and shy. Individuals sought sociality via peer rather than expert 
advice. Yet the therapeutic function of these earlier communities shifted in accordance with neoliberalism’s 
declining arc, becoming spaces for misogynistic frustration and hostility (e.g. 4chan’s /r9k/, Kiwi Farms). As 
one former incel put it, “Rage . . . has completely taken over” (Beauchamp, 2019, para. 7). 
 
What were some of the mediated and misogynistic conditions for the revamped incel, now rejecting 
therapeutic transformation in favor of a toxic masculinity in which women are targeted as the instigators of 
the injuries? There is no incel without the community provided by social media: subreddits, 4chan, blogs—
the online worlds where networked misogyny flourishes (Banet-Weiser, 2018; Banet-Weiser & Miltner, 2015; 
Ging, 2017; Manne, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2015; Massanari, 2017). Ricard (2018) points out that “previous 
generations of men with these same emotional issues would have been solitary, confined to only their own 
thoughts. But modern technology has allowed them to feed on each other and build into frothing extremism” 
(para. 33). Social media sites became spaces where sadness and loneliness could be worked on and 
multiplied. As lonely as they might be, incels are not so as individuals. They are a networked set of actors, 
in communication, inspiring and feeding off each other, while sharing a misogynistic core—an entire 
misogyny media ecology (Ging, 2017). 
 
We can explain some of that shift from the therapeutic function by examining two symbols or 
metaphors in that networked misogyny. As we explained earlier, the Red Pill is a mutated PUA community 
that is focused not solely on sexual strategy, but on the type of men’s rights activism that proclaims 
“feminism is cancer.” The combination of PUA + men’s rights creates a worldview with the belief that women 
are inferior and need to be reduced to their place in sexual and social orders. Red Pill certainly advocates a 
PUA style of self-improvement, but it also furthers a particular antifeminist and antiwoman ideology, one 
that asserts that feminism is strategically trying to harm men. 
 
If the Red Pill retained the PUA style of self-improvement via entrepreneurial strategies and expert 
advice, another tendency in the manosphere is a more nihilistic attitude to improvement, even to existence. 
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The Black Pill rejects the notion that desire and attractiveness are socially constructed and therefore 
malleable, opting instead for more conventional evolutionary biological explanations (Doyle, 2018). For 
them, women are irresistibly attracted to men with certain physical features (prominent jawlines, 
symmetrical faces). No amount of peacocking, negging, or weightlifting will overcome these core features.10 
 
A Black Pilled incel finds life to be an eternal sentence, a curse, a destiny. There is no restarting, 
no possibility of skills-based training for improvement. There’s also no responsibility for one’s lot. As 
journalist David Futrelle notes, 
 
Incel ideology also encourages a sort of nihilistic hopelessness, convincing [men] that 
they are too weird and too uniquely ugly (or short, or whatever) to ever appeal to 
women, and that there’s no hope that they can change themselves or that women will 
change to accept them. . . . And don’t really care if they live or die [emphasis added]. 
(in Doyle, 2018, para. 11) 
 
For these adherents, the depressive certitude of being “forever alone” generates a subject ultimately 
indifferent to their own existence. Unlike previous depressed subjects (brooding solo individuals), here we 
see a loneliness that finds others. But in contrast to a therapeutic mode of connecting with others, this 
nihilistic network does not seek to overcome its condition: Black Pillers accept their fate and even dwell in 
its finality. If forever alone indicates peak neoliberal individualism, it emerges in and through online digital 
culture that connects the isolated in their isolation. Forever alone, together. 
 
With the combination of Red Pill and Black Pill ideologies infusing the milieu, incel support 
transforms from a mutual aid and solidarity network to one that encourages its members to individualize 
via hostility. Internally, the network fosters competition through goading and insults. As one former incel 
writes, there was a “rapid undercurrent of social pressure constantly trying to push me to be the coldest 
and most callous person alive” (Ricard, 2018, para. 18). Individualization remains, but without taking 
responsibility; instead, it crystallizes via trollish competition as a race to extremes. The notion of “support” 
loses its connection to therapeutic empathy and instead becomes mutual incitement and escalation. “To 
exist in these communities is the ultimate contradiction. You share your loneliness, but then to build it into 
anything other than anger is a sign of weakness. There’s a ritual to it” (Ricard, 2018, para. 13). 
Contemporary incels are thus birthed in an inwardly focused, mutually assured antisocial sociability. 
 
While antisocial sociability infuses incels’ own interactions, the aggression is more acute against 
the “social” named in the “social justice Internet” or, for our purposes, “social reproduction”: in a word, 
women. As argued earlier, entrepreneurial reduction of women to instruments and objects continues within 
seemingly oppositional camps (PUAs and incels) and thus enables a slide of frustration from the con game 
failure toward women. When techniques fail, it is because women aren’t playing the game fairly (that is, 
 
10 Some Black Pillers advocate plastic surgery, the masculine makeover that takes neoliberal-era makeovers 
and entrenches them in biological imperatives. It is unclear how widespread or effective the surgeries are. See 
Theweleit’s Male Fantasies (1987) for more on fascist aesthetics and women as targets of rage within fascism. 
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they are not acting as proper object/tool). So the game is destroyed by abolishing women, which is only 
possible because of the inaugural antisocial sociability infusing PUA. 
 
While the incel community sites show contempt for all sexually active women (Staceys) and the 
men who get to sleep with them (Chads), and even for the experts/PUAs, the focus of the violence shifts to 
the women. The passage of online incel communities from sadness and shared isolation to rage and 
vengeance could not have occurred without the easily available affective resources of popular misogyny (in 
this case, the Red Pill and Black Pill), which is always engaged in a threatened relationship with popular 
feminism and indeed blames feminism and women for their sexual disappointment. The misogynist incel 
community targets those who they feel reject them as men, resulting in a manosphere built on desperate 
preservation and violence. And this is where we see the crucially uneven overlay of neoliberalism and 
patriarchy. The failed PUA subject does not act as neoliberalism’s ideal failed subject; he does not turn back 
to himself to restart the project. Rather, he seeks to blame others, namely women, for the failure or, more 
specifically, for robbing him of success. When the reboot short-circuits, and the expectation of women as 
care providers is unmet, the resources of misogyny are readily available for masculine failures. 
 
In the contemporary context, dominant patriarchies both need women (as social reproduction) and 
are threatened by them (feminism in particular). The “injuries” dealt to masculinity are seen as in need of 
repair and recuperation—often through brutally vicious and violent means if social reproduction is not 
performed. And, while misogyny takes different forms, the failed PUAs wield those forms based on their 
expectations about women’s bodies promised by heteronormativity and social reproduction, as well as those 
forms that prescribe rage and vitriol. Neoliberalism’s arc of decline produces a situation in which misogyny 
can accelerate, because it provides a handy template for meaning and action. 
 
Incels and the War on Women 
 
While not all these examples explicitly identify as incels, they are mass killings justified by women’s 
sexual rejection of men. In a conjuncture where popular misogyny is formed around “aggrieved 
entitlements” to women,11 the announced war on women is an extension of everyday expectations and a 
violent response to women’s own responses: their rejection of those expectations (Kimmel, 2014). Incels, 
rather than being an outlier or a subculture, form a networked subject on a continuum of everyday violence, 
mediated and physical. Incel murders are simply the starkest versions of techniques designed to incapacitate 
women, techniques ranging from PUA negging to gaslighting to drugging. Of course, violence against women 
as a control measure is not new, but increasingly the level of impersonality has grown: The killers target 
particular people, but also add indiscriminate victims to their toll—an extension of domestic violence to 
public spaces usually reserved for religious or ideological terrorism. 
 
Not all revenge violence results from being a failed PUA, obviously. Rejection of men by women is 
certainly not new, and it routinely results in hostile reactions, from online harassment, in-person resentful 
comments, and extreme physical violence, including mass killings of women (Citron, 2016; Ging, 2017; 
 
11 In this way, the distinction between incel and normie is not a primary bifurcation when it comes to violence 
against women. Instead, these are both on a continuum of masculinity, in the way Ging (2017) articulates it. 
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Manne, 2017; Marwick & Lewis, 2015; Nagle, 2017a). Domestic and public interpersonal violence is a hostile 
response to women’s individual rejections (examples include women’s refusals to pay attention to street-
harassment-as-erotic advance, to conform to sexual expectations on a date, to stay within an abusive 
domestic arrangement). On a broader scale, what is being rejected is a social order that puts women in 
particular places: a collective refusal to participate in social reproduction as has been coercively assigned to 
women. Incels are a contemporary version of a long-standing reaction “to women not being unofficial service 
and care-industry denizens from birth” (Beauchamp, 2019, para. 118). When women refuse that role in the 
social order, or simply reject particular men in their pursuit of it, their unruliness becomes a target for 
wounded men. 
 
Again, not all of the mentioned revenge-based mass killers are self-described incels, but all have 
been claimed by them, often in an explicitly articulated language of uprising and a war on women. Incels 
have incorporated the language and forms of warfare, revolt, and terrorism, but now in the defense of 
patriarchy. While men’s rights activists already employed the concept and efforts of activism, incels 
announced that they are part of a “revolution” and “rebellion.” 
 
Like other forms of warfare, networked misogyny develops a culture filled with martyrs and heroes: 
Before his mass car killing, Minassian also posted, after hailing Elliot Rodger, the line “Private (Recruit) . . . 
Infantry 00010, wishing to speak to Sgt 4chan please. C23249161.” Saints, martyrs, honor killings: Others 
have noted the parallel to ISIS in the form of online radicalization and in spectacle-based terrorizing via 
mass killings (Martin, 2018). They pen manifestos. They claim credit for mass killings, even if there is no 
self-admission. Moreover, they share a common violent patriarchy, replacing the honor killings based on 
family (the more traditional patriarchal order) with ones based on ego-based individual reputation. As Zoe 
Williams (2018) puts it, “the perpetrators don’t have to meet and their balaclavas don’t have to match. All 
they have to do is establish their hate figures and be consistent” (para. 19). Networked misogyny, formed 
over the years through online harassment, guided trolling, and mutual encouragement, turns into networked 
physical action, what we can call “honor terrorism.” Networked into the fatalistic monadism of “forever 
alone,” incel violence combines femicide with suicide, breaking with the program of self-improvement and 
becoming innovators of technologies of self-destruction. These necropolitical soldiers would rather die and 
kill than lose any patriarchal foundation. 
 
If anyone thought that the war on women was merely metaphorical or juridical, they might have a 
different perspective now that Rodger and others have declared that war, recruited others, and weaponized 
sociality to enact terror. As feminist author Laurie Penny (2018) puts it, 
 
The context is despair. The context is cultural civil war. The context is two thousand years 
of violent religious patriarchy, five centuries of brutal capitalist biopolitics, and a decade 
of punishing austerity that has left a great many young men quaking in the ruins of their 
own promised glory, drowning in unmet expectations. (p. 23) 
 
From involuntary celibate to volunteer soldiers in a misogyny militia, war has clearly been declared 
(Federici, 2012). 
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Conclusion: Out of the Ruins 
 
The PUA community embodies a failure of neoliberal promises—that through tutelage and 
subsequent mastery of a technical skill set, one will achieve success. Asked to entrepreneurialize themselves 
through a reliance on experts while expecting access to women, PUAs were ideal masculine neoliberal 
subjects. PUAs depended on a two-fold confidence: as a resource to be cultivated in oneself (neoliberal 
individualization), and the relation to others in the form of trust in expertise (neoliberal training). 
 
While some attempts at recuperating from failure involve cruel optimism (Berlant, 2011), or a 
repetitive reattachment to neoliberal techniques of self-help, in the PUA failure cases, there is no return to 
the confidence game. The “countless, countless failures” Mystery notes can no longer trust the gurus; they 
have lost confidence in the confidence game. Instead, failed PUAs reveal the con(fidence) game, exposing 
the “con” of confidence. The crisis of the entrepreneurial sexual subject gives us insights into neoliberalism’s 
wider crisis: Technologies of the self are no longer tied to coherent and continuous governing systems, but 
revert to material rackets and swindles. The transition from PUA to incel is emblematic of this decline and 
emergence via de-conning and diffidence. 
 
The result? The command to entrepreneurialize itself becomes an object of mistrust. The ideological 
suturing of peak neoliberalism is now torn, disrupting the smooth operations of the self-starting subject. 
What happens when the resources and techniques encouraged by neoliberal subjective governance are no 
longer renewable? When the subject exhausts them (and themselves in the process) via disillusionment? 
Exposing the con has no necessary politics attached to it. Once the con(fidence) game is revealed as such, 
neoliberalism cannot recuperate failures into its own mechanisms of reproduction and integration. It fails to 
manage its failures. PUA support networks of information and inspiration don’t work, producing 
disillusionment. This disillusionment opens a space for new solutions. What arises from the ruins, or what 
slouches from decline, matters greatly.12 
 
Neoliberalism’s social care deficit means there is no social support, only antisocial support. Incels 
are mutated entrepreneurs—men of action, turning others into instruments, but now subtracting the creative 
from “creative destruction.” Their techniques of disruption are increasingly techniques of pure negation. Like 
the unsuccessful con artist who reverts to armed robbery, some of these failed PUA students turn to weapons 
after their arts of persuasion flop. Instead of mastering the PUA technique of “negging,” which subtly puts 
down a woman to lower her self-esteem, incels are putting down women for good. If incels can’t grift their 
confidence, they too will turn to armed robbery—stealing life from others. 
 
The incel homi-suicidal solution is not a recuperation or a reboot, but a collective reaction that 
annihilates via a necropolitical network. It is on a continuum of reactive techniques to overcome women’s 
refusal of social reproduction roles and to reestablish order (tricks, cons, drugging, abuse, rape, murder). 
Also on this continuum are authoritarian heads of state like Orbán, Trump, and Bolsonaro, who authorize 
 
12 It’s important to note that, in some ways, the failure of PUAs seems to be a relatively minor outcome 
compared with other neoliberal failures, such as global economic collapse, widespread precarity and poverty, 
or the emergence of a kind of neo-fascism. 
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movements to control biological reproduction. What incels call an uprising or rebellion is thus the latest 
version of the war on women that accompanied the rise of capitalism and that, in its current crisis, continues 
to impose a sphere of social reproduction (Federici, 2012). A perspective that begins with neoliberal 
capitalism’s crisis and reversion to its foundational strategies of hostility can better orient us to the terrain, 
actors, and stakes of these antagonisms. 
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